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WHEN EMPATHY BITES BACK:  
CAUTIONARY TALES FROM NEUROSCIENCE 
FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING 
Sheri Lynn Johnson,* Amelia Courtney Hritz,** Caisa Elizabeth Royer*** 
& John H. Blume**** 
 
We must learn to regard people less in light of what they do or omit to do 
and more in light of what they suffer.1 
Because he was just a dumb nigger.2 
INTRODUCTION 
It is not easy to persuade most people to willfully choose to kill another 
human being.3  Because obtaining a death sentence requires persuading 
twelve individuals to do just that, most capital trials involve efforts by the 
prosecutor to dehumanize the defendant.  If jurors come to see the defendant 
as “different,” “other,” or not “fully human,” they are more likely to 
determine that the defendant “deserves” the ultimate punishment, making 
what the U.S. Supreme Court has described as essentially a moral judgment 
about the value of the life of the accused. 
 
*  James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Public Engagement, and 
Assistant Director, Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law School.  This Article is part of a 
symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide 
held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Deborah 
W. Denno, Foreword:  Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience 
Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2016). 
**  Graduate student in the dual J.D./Ph.D. Developmental Psychology and Law Program, 
Cornell University. 
***  Graduate student in the dual J.D./Ph.D. Developmental Psychology and Law Program, 
Cornell University. 
****  Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques and Director, Death Penalty Project, 
Cornell Law School. 
 
 1. DIETRICH BONHOFFER, WITNESS TO JESUS CHRIST 262 (John de Grunchy ed., 1991). 
 2. A juror’s answer to why he believed capital defendant Johnny Bennett murdered the 
victim.  Bennett’s death sentence was later overturned because the sentencing “was so infected 
by racial animus by the prosecutor and a juror . . . that Bennett was deprived of his 
constitutional right to due process.” Andrew Cohen, A Judge Overturned a Death Sentence 
Because the Prosecutor Compared a Black Defendant to King Kong, MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/03/28/a-judge-overturned-a-death-
sentence-because-the-prosecutor-compared-a-black-defendant-to-king-kong#.VJueiNz4G 
[https://perma.cc/2MAU-VS7S]. 
 3. See generally DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING:  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF 
LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (2003). 
574 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
But why is this so? 
The answer lies with the fact that jurors are much less likely to empathize 
with a defendant whom they perceive as being not like them.  This process 
of dehumanization is often pursued through explicit, time-tested strategies, 
such as comparing the defendant to a wild, crazed animal4 or casting him 
(and it is virtually always a “he”) as a psychopathic killer.5  Dehumanization 
also can be pursued implicitly by contrasting the value of a defendant’s life 
with that of the victim.6  No matter how it is accomplished, dehumanizing a 
defendant helps to overcome a juror’s natural human inhibition against taking 
another person’s life.7 
Conversely, lawyers for a defendant facing the ultimate punishment 
generally see their task as humanizing their client.  Defense lawyers believe 
that if jurors can identify with the defendant, imagine his “walk in life,” or 
“see the world through his eyes,” they are less likely to choose the death 
penalty.8  Capital defense teams pursue humanization—for the most part—
through investigation, development, and presentation of mitigating 
evidence.9  The Supreme Court has defined mitigating evidence very broadly:  
anything that might legitimately persuade a juror to choose life over death.10  
Common types of mitigating evidence offered at capital trials include 
evidence of suffering and disadvantage experienced by the defendant, such 
as childhood physical and sexual abuse, low cognitive functioning, poverty, 
brain damage, substance abuse and addiction, trauma, and mental illness, as 
well as positive traits such as prior good acts, talents, and adaptability to 
confinement.11  Such evidence, and the empathy for the defendant it is 
intended to create, is perceived as central to persuading jurors to spare a 
capital defendant’s life.  Without empathy, the exercise of mercy is rare. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Bennett v. Stirling, No. CV 2:13-3191-RMG, 2016 WL 1070812, at *2 
(D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2016) (describing how a prosecutor referred to the defendant as “King Kong 
on a bad day,” a “caveman,” and a “beast of burden”). 
 5. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 931 P.2d 960, 997–98 (Cal. 1997) (comparing the defendant 
to Adolf Hitler, Charles Manson, and the “Sacramento Vampire Killer,” Richard Chase); 
Ballenger v. State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1269 (Miss. 1995) (comparing the defendant to Charles 
Manson). 
 6. See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 776 So. 2d 160, 184–85 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting 
the prosecutor’s closing argument, which compared the victim (an honor student) and the 
victim’s mother (who worked hard to provide for her children) to the defendant (a person who 
“couldn’t get what he wanted”)). 
 7. This is not unique to capital sentencing.  The same process underlies many historical 
forms of medical and animal experimentation. See Sherry F. Colb, The Hidden Atrocities 
Behind Medical Progress, VERDICT (Mar. 30, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/03/30/ 
the-hidden-atrocities-behind-medical-progress (describing medical experiments on slaves 
performed without anesthesia as requiring the suppression of empathy) [https://perma.cc/ 
2UHW-683B]; see also GROSSMAN, supra note 3. 
 8. See Sean D. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It:  Supplementary Guidelines for the 
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 722–
24 (2008). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6 (1986). 
 11. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases:  What Do 
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1547 n.41 (1998). 
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When a capital defendant is sentenced to death, jurors have failed to cross 
what Craig Haney has referred to as “the empathic divide,” which he 
describes as the “inability to perceive capital defendants as enough like 
themselves to readily feel any of their pains, to appreciate the true nature of 
the struggles they have faced, or to genuinely understand how and why their 
lives have taken very different courses from the jurors’ own.”12  This 
inability, in turn, results in jurors making what we (two capital defense 
lawyers and two psychologists) believe to be a fundamental attribution error 
by “systematically discounting the important social, historical, and 
situational determinants of behavior . . . and correspondingly exaggerating 
the causal role of dispositional or individual characteristics.”13 
Thus, empathy lies at the core of the capital trial.  The rub, however, is 
that, despite decades of research, empathy is not clearly understood, and its 
implications for capital trials are largely unexplored.  The confusion is—in 
some part—grounded in varying definitions of empathy used by those 
studying it.14  There are at least eight different methods of conceptualizing 
empathy,15 and the concepts vary when researchers analyze different 
questions.16  Definitions of empathy range from a focus on the cognitive 
ability to understand another person’s perspective (known as “attributionally 
driven” empathy) to the emotional ability to feel what another person feels 
(known as “perceptual and sensory driven” empathy).17 
Advances in neuroscience have allowed researchers to begin exploring the 
different components of empathy.  For example, some studies suggest that 
cognitive and affective components of empathy reflect distinct neural 
mechanisms.18  Neuroscientists typically understand empathy to include an 
 
 12. Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials:  Biographical Racism, 
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2004). 
 13. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide:  Racialized 
Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 590. 
 14. See Frederique de Vignemont & Tania Singer, The Empathic Brain:  How, When and 
Why?, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 435, 435 (2006) (“There are probably nearly as many 
definitions of empathy as people working on the topic.”); Jean Decety & William Ickes, 
Introduction:  Seeking to Understand the Minds (and Brains) of People Who Are Seeking to 
Understand Other People’s Minds, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, at vii, vii (Jean 
Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009) (noting that empathy is a complicated construct that “has 
been used by different writers in very different ways”). 
 15. See C. Daniel Batson, These Things Called Empathy:  Eight Related but Distinct 
Phenomena, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 14, at 3, 4–8 (discussing 
that there are eight different psychological states corresponding to distinct concepts of 
empathy, including (1) knowing another person’s internal state, (2) adopting the posture of an 
observed other, (3) coming to feel as another person feels, (4) projecting oneself into another’s 
situation, (5) imagining how another is feeling, (6) imagining how one would feel in the other’s 
place, (7) feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering, and (8) feeling for another 
person who is suffering). 
 16. See id. at 3 (“Application of the term empathy to so many distinct phenomena is, in 
part, a result of researchers invoking empathy to provide an answer to two quite different 
questions:  How can one know what another person is thinking and feeling?  What leads one 
person to respond with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another?”). 
 17. See Nancy Eisenberg & Natalie D. Eggum, Empathic Responding:  Sympathy and 
Personal Distress, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 14, at 71. 
 18. See infra Part I.A. 
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affective response to another person’s emotions and a cognitive ability to 
adapt the other person’s perspective.19  The first, “affective” component 
involves a neural response similar to the experience of one’s own emotional 
state.  This affective response creates an emotional reaction to imagining the 
other person’s thoughts, feelings, and perspective.20  The second, “cognitive” 
component involves imagining the world through the eyes of another 
person.21  This is an intentional ability that uses cognitive resources to take 
another’s perspective.22  Building on these findings, neuroscientists have 
explored individual differences in the experience of empathy and the impact 
of characteristics of the person with whom they are empathizing (the target 
of the empathy). 
This Article examines the implications of emerging neuroscientific 
findings regarding empathy for capital trials.23  We have approached this task 
with caution because neuroscientists’ understanding of the human brain is 
still evolving.24  As with any new field, if neuroscience is completely trusted 
before it is thoroughly tested, there is a risk of embracing the new 
phrenology.25  Given the state of the research, our advice to defense lawyers 
is quite modest, but we believe that there are some important lessons for 
lawyers, judges, legislators, and other stakeholders in the capital punishment 
system. 
Earlier research from the Capital Jury Project (CJP) has revealed that 
jurors primarily decide whether to impose a sentence of death based on three 
factors:  (1) how heinous they believe the crime was, (2) how dangerous they 
believe the defendant to be, and (3) whether they perceive the defendant to 
 
 19. See Jean Decety & Sara D. Hodges, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, in BRIDGING 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 103 (Paul A.M. Van Lange ed., 2006). 
 20. See Karyn M. Plumm & Cheryl A. Terrance, Battered Women Who Kill:  The Impact 
of Expert Testimony and Empathy Induction in the Courtroom, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
186, 191 (2009). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Jean Decety & Philip L. Jackson, A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy, 
15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 54, 55 (2006). 
 23. Cf. Emily Hughes, The Empathic Divide in Capital Trials:  Possibilities for Social 
Neuroscientific Research, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541 (noting the need for additional research 
to develop methods for crossing the empathic divide). 
 24. See Carl Zimmer, Updated Brain Map Identifies Nearly 100 New Regions, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/science/human-connectome-brain-
map.html (reporting that neuroscientists have recently identified “nearly 100 previously 
unknown [brain] regions” and that “[i]t may take decades for scientists to figure out what each 
region is doing, and more will be discovered in coming decades”) [https://perma.cc/28ZH-
2TZQ]. 
 25. See Simon Oxenham, Thousands of fMRI Brain Studies in Doubt Due to Software 
Flaws, NEW SCIENTIST (July 18, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2097734-
thousands-of-fmri-brain-studies-in-doubt-due-to-software-flaws/ (“It’s another blow for 
neuroscience.  The discovery of major software flaws could render thousands of fMRI brain 
studies inaccurate.”) [https://perma.cc/C7DE-SEJ8]; see also Gerald Bierbaum, SMO:  Front-
Loading Mitigation, VOICE DEF. ONLINE (July 2, 2016), http://www.voiceforthedefense 
online.com/newsletters/2016/July2016.pdf (discussing “overclaiming” based on 
neuroscience) [https://perma.cc/6AUJ-Q4DA]. 
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be remorseful.26  The jurors’ assessment of these three factors, however, is 
influenced by both the race of the defendant and the jurors’ interpretation of 
mitigating evidence.27  Building on this foundation, we explore the empathy 
research to better understand why and how the presumptively legitimate 
factor of mitigating evidence—and the facially impermissible factor of 
race—affect capital sentencing decisions. 
Part I, the bulk of this Article, sets forth the relevant scientific findings 
concerning empathy.  We begin with a brief discussion of what is known 
about empathy, including individual differences for the capacity to 
empathize, and then describe the tendency to empathize with people who feel 
familiar.  Part I also addresses how empathy for one person can cause 
individuals to act with aggression toward others, noting that juror empathy 
for victims can therefore be harmful to capital defendants.  Finally, Part I also 
examines the results of efforts by researchers to increase empathy in a variety 
of contexts. 
Part II turns to the application of this research for the practice of capital 
punishment.  We address both the obligations this knowledge imposes on 
trial courts and the advice it suggests to capital defense lawyers.  We consider 
implications for jury selection, the presentation of evidence, and arguments 
by counsel.  We conclude that the neuroscience findings we have summarized 
provide additional support for our prior conviction:  it is not possible for a 
system of capital punishment to neutrally determine which defendants 
“deserve” death. 
I.  THE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY 
We begin with an overview of the research on the neuroscience of 
empathy, including a discussion of individual differences in empathy, out-
group bias (including racial bias), dehumanization, empathy-linked 
aggression, and what is known about how empathy for another person can be 
increased. 
A.  The Nature of Empathy 
As noted above, there are multiple definitions of empathy that are 
varyingly deployed depending both upon the researcher and the question or 
questions being asked.28  For the purposes of this Article, we define empathy 
as the act of understanding and adopting another’s perspective, either through 
affective or cognitive processes.29  Empathy is distinct from sympathy, which 
 
 26. See John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation:  The Necessity of 
Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1037 
(2008). 
 27. See id. at 1047 n.44. 
 28. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Tamara M. Haegerich & Bette L. Bottoms, Empathy and Jurors’ Decisions in 
Patricide Trials Involving Child Sexual Assault Allegations, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 421, 422 
(2000); see also Frank Krueger et al., Oxytocin Selectively Increases Perceptions of Harm for 
Victims but Not the Desire to Punish Offenders of Criminal Offenses, 8 SOC. COGNITIVE & 
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is the act of feeling “sorrow or concern for another.”30  While sympathy 
involves feeling sadness for another person, empathy involves sharing 
another person’s emotions.31  That emotion could be sadness, but it also could 
be a different emotion, such as pain, happiness, or anger.  Whether sympathy 
and empathy influence behavior in distinct ways is not clear, and 
neuroimaging cannot yet distinguish between sympathetic and affective brain 
responses.32  Despite this uncertainty, many researchers believe that the 
concept of empathy should be defined narrowly.33  By focusing on a narrow 
understanding of empathy that is distinct from sympathy, researchers are able 
to make more precise claims about the neural mechanisms underlying 
empathy and its subsequent influence on behavior.34 
Neuroscientists35 make the distinction that empathy results from two 
different neural processes:  (1) an effortful cognitive attempt to take on 
another person’s perspective (i.e., understanding another’s feelings) and (2) 
an affective response to another person’s emotions (i.e., sharing another’s 
feelings).36  Neuroscientists have attempted to pinpoint where both 
components of empathy occur in the brain using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and have found variation in which brain regions 
are associated with empathy.37 
The cognitive component of empathy is associated with increased activity 
in the frontal and parietal cortices,38 which include networks associated with 
understanding what others are thinking based on their behavior.39  Studies 
demonstrating the affective component of empathy have shown that 
perception of a given behavior in another individual can automatically 
activate one’s own representations of that behavior.40  Mirror neurons likely 
explain this process.41  The mirror neuron system is a network of brain cells 
 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 494, 494 (2013) (defining empathy as “the capacity to share and 
understand the feelings of others”). 
 30. Nancy Eisenberg & Paul Miller, Empathy, Sympathy, and Altruism:  Empirical and 
Conceptual Links, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 292 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer 
eds., 1990). 
 31. See Haegerich & Bottoms, supra note 29, at 438. 
 32. See de Vignemont & Singer, supra note 14, at 439–40. 
 33. See id. at 435. 
 34. See id. 
 35. While most neuroscientists make this distinction, other researchers do not.  
Throughout this Article, we will note if the researcher has indicated that he or she is measuring 
cognitive or affective empathy.  If not specified, the researcher did not distinguish between 
the two. 
 36. See Decety & Hodges, supra note 19, at 103; Plumm & Terrance, supra note 20, at 
191. 
 37. See Decety & Hodges, supra note 19, at 103 (“Our task is not to identify a single 
neural/cognitive module for empathy; no such simple module exists.”). 
 38. See id. at 104. 
 39. See Henrik Walter, Social Cognitive Neuroscience of Empathy:  Concepts, Circuits, 
and Genes, 4 EMOTION REV. 9, 13 (2012) (finding that networks associated with mentalizing 
include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the posteromedial cortex, the bilateral 
temporoparietal junction, and the bilateral superior temporal sulcus). 
 40. See id. at 11. 
 41. See generally Giuseppe di Pellegrino et al., Understanding Motor Events:  A 
Neurophysiological Study, 91 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 176 (1992). 
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that fire both during performance of a task and during observation of the task 
done by another.42  This, in turn, causes the same regions of the brain to be 
involved in the recognition and the expression of specific emotions.43  For 
example, the anterior insula and the cingulate cortex are consistently 
activated during the experience of pain as well as the observation of pain in 
another.44  This is associated with personal distress at witnessing another 
person’s suffering.45  Another important aspect of empathy is recognizing the 
target being observed as separate from oneself.  This activates the temporal 
lobe and prefrontal cortex.46 
Researchers measure two different categories of empathy:  state and trait 
empathy.47  As opposed to the cognitive and affective components, state and 
trait empathy refer to the type of empathy that is being measured, not the 
mechanism by which empathy is experienced.  State empathy is inspired by 
a specific set of circumstances and is temporary.48  This type of empathy is 
created in a particular circumstance when participants are induced to feel 
empathy for a target.  In contrast, trait empathy is an individual’s natural 
ability to empathize with other people.49  Trait empathy is considered to be 
an individual difference and is generally stable.  While researchers can 
measure trait empathy using personality scales, they cannot (currently) 
manipulate it.50 
 
 42. See Karen E. Gerdes et al., Teaching Empathy:  A Framework Rooted in Social 
Cognitive Neuroscience and Social Justice, 47 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 109, 114 (2011); see also 
Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Jean Decety, From the Perception of Action to the Understanding 
of Intention, 2 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 561, 566 (2001) (finding that the premotor 
cortex, the parietal lobe, the supplementary motor area, and the cerebellum are included in the 
neural network). 
 43. See Decety & Hodges, supra note 19, at 104. 
 44. See Philip L. Jackson et al., How Do We Perceive the Pain of Others?  A Window into 
the Neural Processes Involved in Empathy, 24 NEUROIMAGE 771, 775 (2005) (“The results 
demonstrate that watching other individuals in pain-inducing situations triggers a specific part 
of a neural network known to be involved in self-pain processing.”). 
 45. See Walter, supra note 39, at 12, 14 (discussing that activation in these brain regions 
may be due to distress rather than the affective component of empathy). 
 46. See generally Tania Singer et al., Empathetic Neural Responses Are Modulated by the 
Perceived Fairness of Others, 439 NATURE 466 (2006). 
 47. See Walter, supra note 39, at 9. 
 48. See Tania Singer et al., Effects of Oxytocin and Prosocial Behavior on Brain 
Responses to Direct and Vicariously Experienced Pain, 8 EMOTION 781, 787 (2008). 
 49. See id.  Trait empathy may be a result of a genetic component to empathy.  This 
hypothesis has been supported by twin studies. See Walter, supra note 39, at 14.  However, 
without social interaction and emotional bonds with others, it is unlikely that empathy will 
develop even if a person has a biological predisposition for it. See Jean Decety & Philip L. 
Jackson, The Functional Architecture of Human Empathy, 3 BEHAV. & COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE REVIEWS 71, 72 (2004). 
 50. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 49, at 191. 
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Finally, there is some evidence that brain stem neuropeptides,51 such as 
oxytocin and vasopressin, are correlated with empathy.52  For instance, 
researchers have found that oxytocin is associated with increased empathy.53  
Genetic variants affecting oxytocin receptors influence a person’s innate 
predisposition to feel empathy,54 while the administration of oxytocin in a 
laboratory setting has been shown to increase empathy.  Specifically, 
increased oxytocin has been shown to increase empathetic concern for the 
victim of a crime and also improve prosocial feelings, such as trust, 
generosity, and cooperation.55  Nevertheless, studies in which oxytocin is 
administered do not yield consistent results, with some research finding no 
effect of oxytocin on feelings of empathy for another person who is in pain.56  
Most research has focused on oxytocin, and the link between vasopressin and 
empathy is unclear.57  There is some evidence, however, that suggests that 
vasopressin may influence generosity toward strangers and similar social 
behaviors.58 
B.  Individual Differences in Empathy 
Even though trait empathy is somewhat unpredictable, individual 
differences in empathy do matter.  Individuals with higher trait empathy are 
more likely to mimic another’s facial expression, are better at decoding 
others’ expressed emotions, and may exhibit more neural resonance when 
observing another’s pain.59  In addition, studies suggest that variations in trait 
empathy are correlated with variations in brain structure.60 
Perhaps one of the most prominent stereotypes related to empathy is that 
women are more empathetic than men.61  Consistent with that stereotype, 
 
 51. Neuropeptides are molecules that can influence the activity of the brain. See Andreas 
Meyer-Lindenberg et al., Oxytocin and Vasopressin in the Human Brain:  Social 
Neuropeptides for Translational Medicine, 12 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 524, 524 
(2011). 
 52. See C. Sue Carter et al., Neural and Evolutionary Perspectives on Empathy, in THE 
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 14, at 169, 179. 
 53. See Walter, supra note 39, at 14. 
 54. See id. at 14–15. 
 55. See Krueger et al., supra note 29, at 496–97. 
 56. See Singer et al., supra note 48, at 787. 
 57. See Anneke E.K. Buffone & Michael J. Poulin, Empathy, Target Distress, and 
Neurohormone Genes Interact to Predict Aggression for Others—Even Without Provocation, 
40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1406, 1407 (2014). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Alicia J. Hofelich & Stephanie D. Preston, The Meaning in Empathy:  
Distinguishing Conceptual Encoding from Facial Mimicry, Trait Empathy, and Attention to 
Emotion, 26 COGNITION & EMOTION 119, 120 (2012). 
 60. See Alessio Avenanti et al., The Pain of a Model in the Personality of an Onlooker:  
Influence of State-Reactivity and Personality Traits on Embodied Empathy for Pain, 44 
NEUROIMAGE 275, 276 (2009); Michael J. Banissy et al., Inter-individual Differences in 
Empathy Are Reflected in Human Brain Structure, 62 NEUROIMAGE 2034, 2038 (2012).  It is 
not yet known whether variation in brain structure contributes to, or is a consequence of, 
individual differences in empathy. 
 61. See Martin L. Hoffmann, Sex Differences in Empathy and Related Behaviors, 84 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 712, 712 (1977); see also REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM:  THE 
FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 3–4 (2010) (noting that Simon Baron-Cohen’s 
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researchers find that women show higher levels of affective and cognitive 
empathy on self-report measures.62  These differences decrease, however, 
when it is unclear what the survey is measuring, which suggests that women 
may report being empathetic to meet societal expectations.63  A variety of 
behavioral studies of empathy also find that women are more empathetic than 
men.64  For example, studies have found that both young girls and adult 
women are better at inferring what other people are thinking compared to 
males of the same age.65  In addition, gender differences have been found in 
the mirror neuron system, with females showing stronger motor resonance to 
observation of motor activity.66  Overall, however, scientists have been 
unable to find consistent physical differences in male and female brains 
despite years of effort.67  In addition, as is true with respect to many other 
gender differences, neuroscience cannot yet answer whether such differences 
are attributable to a neurological predisposition or different socialization.68  
Women are rewarded for having traits related to empathy, such as 
compassion and responsiveness to the needs of others, while men 
traditionally are encouraged to acquire a different set of traits, such as 
problem solving and logic.69  Consistent with the influence of socialization, 
the increased trait empathy in women usually is attributed to enhanced 
motivation to empathize rather than an intrinsic skill.70  It is however, worth 
noting the influence of oxytocin on empathy, as described above, which 
suggests a possible biological basis for some differences in empathy, given 
that women have much higher levels of oxytocin.71 
 
research on sex differences in “empathizers” and “systemizers” has provoked controversy as 
an explanation for why there are fewer female scientists and engineers compared with female 
teachers and nurses). 
 62. See Banissy et al., supra note 60, at 2036 (finding that women scored higher on self-
report measures of empathic concern for an observed individual and personal distress at 
witnessing negative experiences of others).  But see William Ickes et al., Gender Differences 
in Emapthic Accuracy:  Differential Ability or Differential Motivation?, 7 PERS. 
RELATIONSHIPS 95, 95 (2000) (describing studies finding that men and women believe that 
women had more emotional insight than men, suggesting that this may reflect an American 
stereotype). 
 63. See Yawei Cheng et al., Gender Differences in the Mu Rhythm of the Human Mirror-
Neuron System, PLOS ONE 4 (May 2008), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?id= 
10.1371/journal.pone.0002113.PDF [https://perma.cc/HZQ9-S8SR]. 
 64. See Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen, Empathizing:  Neurocognitive 
Developmental Mechanisms and Individual Differences, 156 PROGRESS BRAIN RES. 403, 408–
09 (2006) (reviewing research on gender differences in empathy).  Simon Baron-Cohen 
theorizes that “the female brain is predominantly hard-wired for empathy” based on low fetal 
exposure to testosterone, but research findings across samples and research teams have been 
largely inconsistent. JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 61, at 85–87; see also Martin Schulte-Ruther 
et al., Gender Differences in Brain Networks Supporting Empathy, 42 NEUROIMAGE 393 
(2008). 
 65. See Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, supra note 64, at 408. 
 66. See Cheng et al., supra note 63, at 1–2. 
 67. See JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 61, at 49–52. 
 68. See Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, supra note 64, at 408. 
 69. See Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 712. 
 70. See Ickes et al., supra note 62, at 107–08. 
 71. See Walter, supra note 39, at 14.  Women have even higher levels of oxytocin while 
giving birth, during breast feeding, and during early interactions with their babies. See Jennifer 
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In addition to gender differences, research has shown disparities in 
empathy correlated with age, though the results are not always consistent.72  
In one study, older adults (aged sixty to eighty) demonstrated higher levels 
of affective empathy and gave higher self-report measures of cognitive 
empathy than any other age group.73  However, despite their high self-report 
measures, when older adults were given a test which required them to 
interpret what emotion was being communicated by a pair of eyes, their 
scores on the test were significantly lower than any other age group.74  These 
apparently contradictory results could be reconciled as reflecting the fact that 
older adults have more difficulty interpreting emotional cues than any other 
age group, as demonstrated in other studies,75 and may suggest that cognitive 
empathy requires a more effortful process for older adults.76 
Individual differences in the ability or propensity to empathize may predict 
behavior.77  This distinction between capacity and propensity reflects the fact 
that the cognitive component of empathy is not automatic but depends on 
attention and motivation.78  For example, when helping others is costly, 
individuals will have decreased motivation to empathize.79  When ability and 
propensity are distinguished, one interesting result is that individuals who are 
diagnosed with psychopathy (and juveniles diagnosed with a conduct 
disorder) have high ability to emphasize but low propensity to empathize.80 
Experience also plays a role in empathy, but it is a double-edged sword.  
Individuals who have experienced adversity are better able to take another 
person’s perspective in a similar situation and, thus, are more likely to 
 
Hahn-Holbrook et al., Parental Precaution:  Neurobiological Means and Adaptive Ends, 35 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1052, 1061–62 (2011) (describing studies finding that 
breast feeding mothers have higher levels of circulating oxytocin and increased aggressive 
tendencies toward potential intruders compared to formula feeding mothers). 
 72. See Linda Rueckert & Nicolette Naybar, Gender Differences in Empathy:  The Role 
of the Right Hemisphere, 67 BRAIN & COGNITION 162, 165 (2008); see also Zeinab Khanjani 
et al., Comparison of Cognitive Empathy, Emotional Empathy, and Social Functioning in 
Different Age Groups, 50 AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOLOGIST 80, 83 (2015) (noting in addition that 
there “is a contradictory literature about the change of empathy during ageing”). 
 73. See Khanjani et al., supra note 72. 
 74. See id. at 81–83 (describing the “Eyes Test” as an exam which “requir[es] participants 
to select which of four words best describes the thoughts or feelings expressed in 36 pictures 
of the eyes”). 
 75. See Sarah E. MacPherson et al., Age, Executive Function, and Social Decision 
Making:  A Dorsolateral Prefrontal Theory of Cognitive Aging, 17 PSYCHOL. & AGING 598, 
606 (2002) (finding an age impairment for “labeling the emotion sadness”); Louise H. Phillips 
et al., Age and the Understanding of Emotions:  Neuropsychological and Sociocognitive 
Perspectives, 57 J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B P526, P529 (2002) (finding “no overall age effect 
on identifying emotions from faces” but “significant age impairments in the ability to identify 
anger and sadness”). 
 76. See Khanjani et al., supra note 72, at 83 (“Emotion recognition is a gut feeling for 
young adults, but older adults need to dedicate more processing resources to achieve 
accuracy.”). 
 77. See Christian Keysers & Valeria Gazzola, Dissociating the Ability and Propensity for 
Empathy, 18 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 163, 163 (2014). 
 78. See id. at 163–64. 
 79. See id. at 164. 
 80. See id. at 163. 
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experience empathic concern.81  This in turn causes a propensity to be 
compassionate and to partake in costly prosocial behavior.82  However, 
reduced empathy after repeated exposure to suffering can in some instances 
be adaptive because it may lower the personal distress associated with 
observing the suffering of another.83  Consequently (and counterintuitively), 
in certain situations, individuals with multiple exposure to an empathy-
triggering situation may be less likely to react empathetically.84  For example, 
doctors with experience administering acupuncture are less likely than 
nondoctors to experience empathy when seeing body parts being pricked by 
needles.85 
C.  Out-Group Bias and Empathy 
Human beings are prone to characterize others into “in-groups” and “out-
groups.”86  Categorization may be based on race, age, and gender, as well as 
multiple other affiliation factors.  Considering another person to be in the 
same category as oneself contributes to a feeling of similarity, which in turn 
increases empathy.87  Moreover, thinking of others as part of a different 
category increases alienation, which interferes with humanization, the ability 
to understand the other person’s perspective and attribute human 
characteristics to the other person.88 
 
 81. See Daniel Lim & David DeSteno, Suffering and Compassion:  The Links Among 
Adverse Life Experiences, Empathy, Compassion, and Prosocial Behavior, 16 EMOTION 175, 
180 (2016).  Examples of adversity include illness, violence, bereavement, social-
environmental stress, and disasters. See id. at 177. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Yawei Cheng et al., Expertise Modulates the Perception of Pain in Others, 17 
CURRENT BIOLOGY 1708, 1711–12 (2007). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Ruben T. Azevedo et al., Their Pain Is Not Our Pain:  Brain and Autonomic 
Correlates of Empathetic Resonance with the Pain of Same and Different Race Individuals, 
34 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 3168, 3169 (2013). 
 87. See Plumm & Terrance, supra note 20, at 191; Adam Waytz & Nicholas Epley, Social 
Connection Enables Dehumanization, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 70, 71 (2012) 
(finding that “[b]eing part of a football team, political party, a church, or a married couple 
identifies who is in one’s social circle as well as who is out of one’s circle”); see also John F. 
Dovidio et al., Empathy and Intergroup Relations, in PROSOCIAL MOTIVES, EMOTION, AND 
BEHAVIOR:  THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 393, 395 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip 
Shaver eds., 2010); James D. Johnson et al., Rodney King and O.J. Revisited:  The Impact of 
Race and Defendant Empathy Induction on Judicial Decisions, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1208, 1208–09 (2002). 
 88. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 71 (“People consider themselves to be 
exemplars of humanity, and as others become less similar to the self, they are evaluated as less 
humanlike as well.”).  This is reflected in the tendency of soccer fans to be willing to engage 
in costly helping behavior for fans of the same team, but not for fans of the rival team. See 
Boris C. Bernhardt & Tania Singer, The Neural Basis of Empathy, 35 ANN. REV. 
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 12–13 (2012). 
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1.  Race and the Influence of Bias 
Racial categorization can occur subliminally and within milliseconds.89  
Because race is such a “powerful salient cue of group membership,” the race 
of an actor can greatly influence the observer’s ability to empathize.90  
Observations of neural activity reveal a disturbing fact:  people respond more 
strongly to the pain of same-race individuals than to the pain of different-race 
individuals.91  Specifically, neurological mirror systems are less responsive 
when viewing people of another race in pain, thus causing individuals to 
experience decreased sharing of the emotional components of pain in people 
of another race.92  Moreover, these disparities are correlated with implicit 
bias levels—participants with greater implicit bias are even less affected 
when viewing physical suffering of other-race individuals than are 
participants with lower levels of implicit bias.93  One factor that may be 
driving this result is that implicit bias may impact the ability to recognize 
emotions, like sadness and anger, in out-group members.94  For example, 
individuals with higher levels of implicit bias are quicker to perceive anger 
in black faces compared to white faces.95  Finally, studies focusing on 
cognition and prejudice have found a correlation between implicit bias and 
differences in amygdala activation.96  Studies have also found that 
participants tend to present greater amygdala activity in response to black 
 
 89. See Azevedo et al., supra note 86, at 3169. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Multiple studies reveal different responses to watching hands or faces of the same 
race, another race, and a fictitious race (violet) being pricked by a needle or poked with a Q-
tip. See Alessio Avenanti et al., Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance with 
Other-Race Pain, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1018, 1018–19 (2010) (finding that when white and 
black individuals living in Italy observed the pain of same-race and fictional-race individuals, 
their corticospinal systems were inhibited as if they were feeling the pain, but this did not 
occur when they observed other-race individuals in pain); Azevedo et al., supra note 86, at 
3179 (examining white and black participants and finding increased hemodynamic activity 
within the bilateral anterior insula (an area involved in processing of first- and third-person 
emotional experiences of pain) for same-race pain); Vani A. Mathur et al., Racial 
Identification Modulates Default Network Activity for Same and Other Races, 33 HUM. BRAIN 
MAPPING 1883, 1888–90 (2012) (finding increased activity within the medial prefrontal cortex 
(associated with the self) when viewing pictures of same-race individuals in a natural disaster); 
Xiaojing Xu et al., Do You Feel My Pain?:  Racial Group Membership Modulates Empathic 
Neural Responses, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8525, 8528 (2009) (scanning Chinese and white 
participants and finding reduced neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (associated 
with the emotional experience of pain) when watching different-race faces in pain). 
 92. See Avenanti et al., supra note 60, at 275–76. 
 93. See Avenanti et al., supra note 91, at 1019–20 (finding a linear relationship between 
implicit bias and increased empathic-related brain responses for own-race pain compared to 
other-race pain); Azevedo et al., supra note 86, at 3175–76 (same). 
 94. See Gijsbert Bijlstra et al., Stereotype Associations and Emotion Recognition, 40 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 567, 571–74 (2014). 
 95. See Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice:  Implicit Prejudice 
and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 641–43 (2003). 
 96. See Jennifer T. Kubota et al., The Neuroscience of Race, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 
940, 940–42 (2012); Adam M. Chekroud et al., A Review of Neuroimaging Studies of Race-
Related Prejudice:  Does Amygdala Response Reflect Threat?, FRONTIERS HUM. 
NEUROSCIENCE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2014.001 
79/full [https://perma.cc/H4YG-L58N]. 
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male faces, regardless of the participants’ race and gender.97  This increased 
activation may reflect a threat response, which is likely caused by the 
stereotype that black men are dangerous.98 
These observations are corroborated by behavioral studies, which also find 
a connection between racial groups and empathy.99  Most pertinent here, 
mock jury studies find that participants report greater empathy for same-race 
criminal defendants than for other-race defendants and accordingly assign 
harsher punishment to other-race defendants.100 
2.  Dehumanization 
Dehumanization occurs when someone denies uniquely human 
characteristics, for example, a mental state or secondary emotions like 
nostalgia or humiliation,101 to another human being.102  Dehumanization can 
lead to a general feeling of indifference to another person and his or her well-
being.103 
Lasana Harris and his colleagues developed the stereotype content model 
to explain how dehumanization occurs.104  Their model posits that people use 
stereotypes as automatic mental shortcuts to determine the “humanness” of 
another.105  Harris maintains that people perceive others along two different 
dimensions:  warmth and competence.106  Someone who is perceived as high 
 
 97. See Chekroud et al., supra note 96, at 3. 
 98. See id. at 4. 
 99. See, e.g., Brian B. Drwecki et al., Reducing Racial Disparities in Pain Treatment:  The 
Role of Empathy and Perspective-Taking, 152 PAIN 1001, 1003–04 (2011) (finding that white 
nurses and students exhibited greater empathy to white patients’ pain expressions, which 
predicted better pain treatment to white patients). 
 100. See Johnson et al., supra note 87, at 1215–16 (finding that white students reported 
greater empathy for white criminal defendants than black defendants and assigned more 
lenient punishment to white defendants); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Emotion, Authority, 
and Death:  (Raced) Negotiations in Mock Capital Jury Deliberations, 40 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 377, 395–400 (2015) (finding that white male jurors were more likely to focus on 
empathy for white male defendants during jury deliberation and more likely to downplay the 
importance of empathy for black male defendants and that this increased focus on empathy 
lead to significantly more life sentences). 
 101. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 70. 
 102. See C. Daryl Cameron et al., The Emotional Cost of Humanity:  Anticipated 
Exhaustion Motivates Dehumanization of Stigmatized Targets, 7 SOC. PSYCHOL. & 
PERSONALITY SCI. 105, 105 (2016) (discussing the “intentional stance,” wherein people grant 
humanity to others by assuming that they have their own minds, intentions, plans, and goals); 
Lasana T. Harris & Susan Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low:  Neuroimaging 
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847 (2006). 
 103. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 74–75 (“[D]ehumanization is often conceived 
as a source of antipathy toward others—a visceral disliking—when it may in fact be better 
understood as a general indifference or apathy to others’ mental states and experience.”). 
 104. See Harris & Fiske, supra note 102, at 847; see also Beatrice H. Capestany & Lasana 
T. Harris, Stereotype Content, in EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, SEARCHABLE, AND LINKABLE RESOURCE 1, 5–6 (Robert A. 
Scott & Stephen M. Kosslyn eds., 2015) (ebook). 
 105. See Capestany & Harris, supra note 104, at 2 (“But if stereotypes short-circuit regular 
social cognitive processes that allow us to perceive a person as human, stereotypes will 
involuntarily allow for some outgroups . . . to be denied their humanness.”). 
 106. See Harris & Fiske, supra note 102, at 847. 
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in “warmth” would be believed by others to have good intentions and be 
friendly, trustworthy, and sincere.107  Someone who is perceived as high in 
“competence” would be believed by others to be capable and have agency.108  
The theory postulates that people behave toward others according to their 
perceived level of warmth and competence.109  If someone is perceived as 
high competence and high warmth, others view them with pride.  Envy is 
associated with high competence and low warmth, and pity is associated with 
low competence and high warmth.110 
If someone is perceived to be low in both warmth and competence, others 
will be disgusted by them.111  Disgust is the only emotion which results in 
the dehumanization of the target and often occurs when the target is an out-
group member.112  The social cognition brain network is activated at a 
reduced level when participants feel disgust toward one another.113 
Stereotypes, including biases against out-group members, can help explain 
why dehumanization occurs.114  When stereotypes are relied upon, the 
targeted individual is not given the benefit of social cognitive processing, 
which would ascribe thoughts, feelings, and motivations to that person.  
Dehumanization may also occur if the observer wishes to participate in 
immoral behavior (in particular, causing harm to another),115 cope with his 
or her own past wrongdoing,116 or avoid the emotional exhaustion associated 
with helping another.117 
 
 107. See Susan T. Fiske, Varieties of (De)Humanization:  Divided by Competition and 
Status, 60 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 53, 54 (2013). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Hughes, supra note 23, at 548–50 (summarizing the stereotype content model in 
more detail). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Cameron et al., supra note 102, at 1. 
 112. See id.; Hughes, supra note 23, at 549, 551. 
 113. See Capestany & Harris, supra note 104, at 7.  The social cognition brain network 
consists of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which becomes activated when participants 
engage in social cognition tasks. See Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Social Groups That 
Elicit Disgust Are Differentially Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE 
NEUROSCIENCES 45, 45–48 (2007); see also Hughes, supra note 23, at 551 (discussing how the 
mPFC is also activated at a lower level when participants view out-group members). 
 114. See Capestany & Harris, supra note 104, at 8, 11; Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 
71 (“[T]he clearest examples of dehumanization arise in intergroup settings in which ingroup 
members dehumanize outgroup members.”). 
 115. Sabina Cehajic et al., What Do I Care?:  Perceived Ingroup Responsibility and 
Dehumanization as Predictors of Empathy Felt for the Victim Group, 12 GROUP PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP REL. 715, 716–17 (2009).  The desire to participate in immoral behavior is 
associated with greater tolerance of harm aimed toward an out-group due to moral exclusion, 
which occurs when a target is perceived to exist outside of the realm in which moral values 
and fairness apply. See Susan Opotow, Moral Exclusion and Injustice:  An Introduction, 46 
J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 1–2 (1990). 
 116. See Emanuele Castano & Roger Giner-Sorlla, Not Quite Human:  Infrahumanization 
in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 804, 816–17 (2006) (finding that people dehumanize victims to excuse actions of 
their in-group members); Cehajic et al., supra note 115, at 716–18 (finding that it is easier for 
spectators to disengage from pain and avoid feeling empathy for a victim if that victim is 
dehumanized). 
 117. See Cameron et al., supra note 102, at 2, 6 (finding anticipated emotional exhaustion 
of helping a homeless person mediates whether the participant assigns a mental state to the 
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Dehumanization has been shown to result in reduced empathy and 
diminished motivation to help others.  For example, participants perceive 
helping a homeless person suffering from drug addiction (a stigmatized, out-
group condition) to be more exhausting than providing aid to a homeless 
person suffering from uncontrollable mental illness (a less stigmatized 
condition).118  They also viewed the homeless person afflicted with mental 
illness to be suffering more than the drug addict.  This study suggests that 
feelings of disgust create a mental barrier to helping someone in need because 
the effort to help that person is perceived as more emotionally taxing than 
helping someone else. 
Some research has shown that people in positions of power are more likely 
to dehumanize out-group members, especially after being asked to make a 
difficult decision that could negatively impact an out-group.119  In this 
situation, dehumanization is used to justify a difficult decision for which the 
decision maker feels responsible.  This is also true where the person is not 
responsible for the decision, but his or her in-group is responsible.120  Thus, 
for example, if one country declares war on another, a citizen may 
dehumanize those living in the other country.121  Ironically, a social 
connection may at times enable dehumanization.122  Participants who were 
primed by researchers to feel a social connection were more likely to 
dehumanize out-group members.123  One possible explanation for this result 
is that people who feel socially disconnected have a greater need to create 
bonds with other humans and thus are more likely to exert energy to connect 
with strangers or out-group members.124 
In the courtroom, the process of dehumanization may be facilitated by the 
purposeful engagement of stereotypes.  Most transparent is the use of 
language linking an African American defendant to nonhuman primates.125  
Research has shown that both black and white participants associate 
photographs of black people with apes.  Moreover, this association is often 
present even in participants who do not display overt racism.  The media may 
both reflect and exacerbate such associations:  newspapers are far more likely 
 
homeless person); cf. Jeroen Vaes & Martina Muratore, Defensive Dehumanization in the 
Medical Practice:  A Cross-Sectional Study from a Health Care Worker’s Perspective, 52 
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 180, 185–87 (2013) (showing that nurses who humanize their patients 
report higher levels of emotional exhaustion). 
 118. Cameron et al., supra note 102, at 5–6. 
 119. See Joris Lammers & Diederik A. Stapel, Power Increases Dehumanization, 14 
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 113, 122 (2011). 
 120. See Castano & Giner-Sorlla, supra note 116. 
 121. See id. at 806. 
 122. See Waytz & Epley, supra note 87, at 74–75. 
 123. See id.  To prime social connection, participants were asked to come to the study with 
a close friend. See id. at 73. 
 124. See id. at 71 (“People who feel socially disconnected likewise seek to satisfy this drive 
by attempting to connect with others, even attributing humanlike traits to nonhuman agents 
that render them suitable agents of social connection . . . [and] people who feel socially 
connected are less motivated to affiliate with others.”). 
 125. See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human:  Implicit Knowledge, Historical 
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 
292–93 (2008). 
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to describe African American defendants facing the death penalty with ape-
related words than they are to describe white defendants with those words.126 
The association to apes is linked to disgust.  Priming participants to feel 
disgust causes them to associate out-group members with animals at higher 
rates.127  These associations are not without consequence; when participants 
are primed with the word “ape,” they are more likely to believe that physical 
violence used against a black suspect by the police was justified.128 
D.  Empathy-Linked Aggression 
Prosocial behavior, including empathy-motivated altruism, is regulated by 
a caregiving behavioral system through which individuals are motivated to 
help and reduce the suffering of others.129  The empathy-altruism hypothesis 
suggests that empathy leads to a desire to help someone who is in trouble.130  
This system is activated when someone witnesses the plight of a “valued” 
other, or someone in the same in-group.  As noted earlier, this process is 
facilitated by oxytocin and vasopressin, both of which influence social 
behavior and empathy.131 
Although activation of this system typically leads to prosocial behavior, 
empathy-induced behavior is not necessarily moral.132  This is because the 
empathy-induced altruism is a narrow target, focused on the distressed 
individual, and may ignore larger concerns such as fairness or impartiality.133  
For example, when individuals feel no empathy, they tend to distribute 
resources in a game fairly, but when they are induced to feel empathy for a 
targeted group, they give preferential treatment to that group.134 
More troubling, researchers have shown that empathy can lead to 
antisocial and aggressive behavior.135  If a person is motivated to protect the 
target of his or her empathy, that person may be inclined to punish others 
who are hurting or inhibiting that target.  For example, in one study, 
researchers found that giving oxytocin to participants increased the 
 
 126. See id. at 303–04 (examining the usage of fifty-four words connoting bestial or 
subhuman qualities in news articles). 
 127. See Erin E. Buckles & Paul D. Trapnell, Disgust Facilitates Outgroup 
Dehumanization, 16 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 771, 776–77 (2013). 
 128. See Goff et al., supra note 125, at 302. 
 129. See Jennifer L. Goetz et al., Compassion:  An Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical 
Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 351, 354 (2010). 
 130. See C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis, 61 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 413, 413 (1991). 
 131. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1418–19; see also supra notes 51–57 and 
accompanying text.  Neurotransmitters are activated when someone senses distress in another 
and motivate the actor to provide aid to the vulnerable person. 
 132. See C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism:  When 
Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1042, 1043 (1995). 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id.; see also Julie A. Weir & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Determinants of Mock 
Jurors’ Verdicts in a Rape Case, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 901, 913–15 (1990) (finding 
that empathy for victims predicted belief that the victim had been raped). 
 135. See Johannes Keller & Stefan Pfattheicher, The Compassion-Hostility Paradox:  The 
Interplay of Vigilant, Prevention-Focused Self-Regulation, Compassion, and Hostility, 39 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1518, 1521 (2013). 
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participant’s empathy for in-group members—but also increased aggression 
toward competing out-group members.136  In another study, researchers 
found that participants who were in a high-empathy condition were more 
likely to give greater amounts of painful stimulus (hot sauce) to the 
empathetic target’s competitors, even though the competitor did not cause 
any harm to the target.137  Researchers also have found that mock jurors who 
have high empathy for a victim are more confident in a defendant’s guilt, 
believe the defendant to be more responsible for the crime, and give harsher 
sentences.138 
Observation of this association between aggression and empathy, often 
referred to as the compassion-hostility paradox,139 is consistent with the 
results of prior research from the Capital Jury Project (CPJ).  The CPJ 
interviews revealed that juror empathy for murder victims influences capital 
sentencing:  when jurors reported that they had imagined themselves in the 
victim’s situation, they were more likely to have felt empathy for the victim 
and more likely to have sentenced the defendant to death.140 
Several factors predict empathy-linked aggression.  Interestingly, more 
empathetic people seem more likely to experience empathy-induced 
aggression.141  For example, one study found participants who scored high 
on an empathy scale were more likely to punish the behavior of a drunk driver 
(as well as more willing to help the victim) than less empathetic 
participants.142  Another factor that may predict empathy-linked aggression 
is the intensity of the victim’s distress.143  Finally, when emotional stimuli 
cause heightened emotion, effortful cognitive processing is decreased.144  
This decrease in cognitive processing may lead to increased punitiveness, 
because jurors do not have the emotional capacity to empathize and relate to 
the perpetrator of the victim’s distress. 
Nevertheless, empathy does not always produce aggression.  Some studies 
have found that empathy can reduce the desire to harm intentional 
 
 136. See Carsten K.W. De Dreu et al., The Neuropeptide Oxytocin Regulates Parochial 
Altruism in Intergroup Conflict Among Humans, 328 SCIENCE 1408, 1409–11 (2010) (testing 
participants’ response to nonteammates during a financially based game after being given 
oxytocin or a placebo). 
 137. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1418–19. 
 138. See Sheila R. Deitz et al., Measurement of Empathy Toward Rape Victims and Rapists, 
43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372, 376 (1982) (using the example of an ambiguous 
rape trial). 
 139. See De Dreu et al., supra note 136, at 1408–11 (showing that there is a positive 
association between compassion and hostility). 
 140. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy:  The Problem of Worthy and 
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV 343, 359–60 (2003). 
 141. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1408. 
 142. See Guy D. Vitaglione & Mark A. Barnett, Assessing a New Dimension of Empathy:  
Empathetic Anger as a Predictor of Helping and Punishing Desires, 27 MOTIVATION & 
EMOTION 301, 312–13 (2003) (using a scale that measures trait-empathetic aggression); see 
also Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1417–18. 
 143. See Buffone & Poulin, supra note 57, at 1408. 
 144. See Jessica M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors’ 
Judgments:  The Promise of Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 273, 277 (2009). 
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wrongdoers.  For example, in an experiment in which a confederate cheated 
on a task to earn higher compensation than the other competitors, participants 
were asked to choose how much hot sauce the cheating confederate would be 
required to consume.145  When the confederate cheated, the participants gave 
the confederate far more hot sauce than when the confederate did not cheat.  
However, when participants underwent a compassion-inducing task toward 
an unrelated third-party before being asked to assign the hot sauce amounts, 
the participants no longer punished the confederate.  The more compassion 
the participants felt toward the third party, the less hot sauce the participant 
gave to the confederate.  Thus, in this scenario, priming participants with 
feelings of compassion resulted in less aggression toward an intentional 
wrongdoer. 
One might speculate that these results can be reconciled by the difference 
between the targets of empathy; that is, when the target of empathy has been 
harmed by the wrongdoer, then aggression is induced, but when the target of 
the empathy is unrelated to the wrongdoer, empathy is increased for the 
wrongdoer as well.  However, research also shows that doses of oxytocin 
increase the perception of harm suffered by a victim, yet do not 
simultaneously increase the desire to punish those that cause the harm.146 
E.  Increasing Empathy 
Researchers have tried to induce empathy in two ways.  First, a person’s 
emotional state may be conveyed to the prospective empathizer through 
facial expressions, bodily movements, and visible injuries.  Alternatively, 
empathy may be induced by cognitive processes such as inferences or 
thoughts based on contextual information, for example, by learning that 
someone has lost a job or been diagnosed with a serious illness.147  
Instructing the participant to imagine him- or herself in the other’s place 
increases the empathic neural response above and beyond the level of 
empathy experienced while watching a person.148  In one odd application of 
this idea, researchers were able to stimulate activity in the social cognition 
brain network of participants by asking the participants to consider whether 
the photographed out-group member liked a certain vegetable.149  However, 
the same humanizing brain activity was not triggered when participants were 
asked to imagine what the person’s age was.150  One interpretation of these 
results is that trying to assess someone else’s preferences requires imagining 
how that person would think about things, which has an “individuating” 
effect, in the words of the researchers.151  In contrast, estimation of age 
 
 145. See Paul Condon & David DeSteno, Compassion for One Reduces Punishment for 
Another, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 698, 698–701 (2011). 
 146. See Krueger et al., supra note 29. 
 147. See Walter, supra note 39, at 11. 
 148. See Decety & Jackson, supra note 49, at 84. 
 149. See Harris & Fiske, supra note 113, at 50. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, 
from Category-Based to Individuating Processes:  Influences of Information and Motivation 
on Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1–2 (1990). 
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focuses on the outside, permitting the subject to use external cues, and 
therefore does not require imagination or individuation. 
Other research corroborates these neuroscience results.  Social 
psychologists have found that similar instructions induce empathy for out-
group members,152 reduce prejudice and bias toward the out-group,153 and 
improve attitudes toward the out-group as a whole.154  Induced empathy can 
increase positive attitudes toward stigmatized groups.155  In one study, 
participants who listened to interviews with convicted murderers and who 
were asked to imagine that they were in their position showed more positive 
feelings toward convicted murders two weeks after the study than 
participants who were asked to remain objective.156 
Similar techniques have been used to study the effects of empathy on jury 
decision making in criminal cases.  For example, in one study, participants 
read a narrative about a larceny case and then were instructed to read a 
passage written by the defendant in order to get more information about the 
defendant.157  Participants in a high-empathy condition were asked to put 
themselves in the position of the defendant while reading the passage, while 
participants in a low-empathy condition were asked to be objective.158  
Participants in a control condition did not read the passage about the 
defendant.159  Participants in the high-empathy condition gave the defendant 
more lenient punishments than participants in the other two conditions and 
also tended to view the crime as situationally induced rather than as a product 
of the defendant’s character.160  However, across all conditions, white 
defendants were given more lenient punishments.161 
II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING 
Now we turn to the practical uses of empathy research in capital 
sentencing, with a focus on jury selection, the presentation of evidence, and 
arguments made by defense counsel. 
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A.  Jury Selection 
It has long been obvious that the identity of the capital jurors matters 
enormously.  We see this in the large disparities in willingness of various 
states—and various localities within states—to impose death sentences.162  
We also see this in disparities between the willingness of various 
demographic groups to impose death sentences as reflected in public polls163 
and as revealed in mock jury studies.164  Occasionally we see a very specific 
manifestation of the importance of the decision maker when a life sentence 
is imposed on a more culpable codefendant by one jury while a death 
sentence is imposed upon the less culpable by another jury.  The neuroscience 
of empathy is very helpful in explaining how the identity of the jurors affects 
decision making, but it is not so helpful in figuring out how to eliminate the 
effects of individual differences. 
1.  Racially Similar Jurors 
The prior evidence that race influences the decision making of capital 
jurors came from many, many sources.  These include historical evidence of 
breathtaking disparities in the imposition of death sentences prior to Furman 
v. Georgia,165 particularly in rape cases; multiple statistical analyses of death 
sentences, most of which find large and significant race-of-the-victim effects, 
and about half of which also find significant race-of-the-defendant effects,166 
including some studies with independent assessment of aggravation and 
mitigation;167 mock jury studies that find race-of-defendant and race-of-
victim effects in white jurors’ assessment of both aggravating and mitigating 
evidence and in their choice of life or death sentences;168 mock jury studies 
that find that diverse juries ameliorate the effects of racial discrimination; and 
numerous individual cases in which race played an explicit invidious role in 
the decision making of prosecutors, defense counsel, and jurors.169 
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What neuroscience adds to this picture is the likelihood that racially 
influenced decision making often is not rooted in conscious choice but stems 
from observably different reactions in the brain.  This is not, of course, to say 
that racial favoritism is hardwired, or biologically determined, but rather to 
say that given that race is a strong predictor of perceptions of in-group and 
out-group membership in our society, differential triggering of empathic 
responses will be common.  This means—as the prior evidence also implies—
that the racial composition of the jury in a minority-race capital defendant’s 
case may be dispositive.  However, the legal system’s current mechanism for 
ferreting out bias—voir dire—is unable to identify bias of which potential 
jurors are unaware. 
Thus, neuroscience reinforces the importance of vigilant judicial 
enforcement of prohibitions against discrimination in jury selection.  In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has been somewhat more vigilant in its 
enforcement of the prohibition against racially motivated exercise of 
peremptory challenges.  However, reversals have largely been limited to 
“smoking gun” cases.170  As many commentators have noted, the prohibition 
against discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge is widely 
ignored, causing some commentators—and justices—to suggest its abolition.  
The neuroscientific findings we report argue for either more vigorous 
enforcement of the antidiscrimination norm or for an outright ban on 
peremptory challenges. 
But neuroscience also suggests that enforcement of prohibitions against 
affirmative exclusion of minority jurors is insufficient to provide race-neutral 
decisions of deathworthiness.  The mechanism by which members of the 
defendant’s racial or ethnic group are excluded is not the problem; it is the 
ultimate composition of the jury that matters.  The Supreme Court, however, 
has explicitly rejected any right to racially similar jurors, so eradication of 
the effects of racially influenced empathy is not a real possibility, at least in 
the short run. 
2.  Empathetic Jurors 
While voir dire is unlikely to reveal racial bias, extensive voir dire may 
shed light upon which jurors have the potential to see a human being behind 
a crime.  The Supreme Court has insisted that defendants must be able to 
present any evidence in mitigation that might reasonably lead a juror to 
conclude that death is not the appropriate sentence.  This insistence, however, 
has no meaning if seated jurors are incapable of responding with empathy to 
the relevant “diverse frailties” of humankind.  General questions as to 
 
stating, “I knew I would vote for the death penalty because that’s what that nigger deserved”) 
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whether jurors “can consider” evidence in mitigation cannot answer whether 
a particular juror can recognize and appreciate a defendant’s suffering or can 
only see the suffering the defendant has caused.  Thus, courts that have 
refused to permit questioning of jurors about their receptivity to particular 
forms of mitigation thwart the purpose of individualized sentencing.171 
Concomitantly, defense counsel who have relied upon generalizations 
about what kind of jurors are likely to vote for life—jurors who have endured 
hardships themselves or employed in the helping professions—must realize 
that such reliance is probably ill advised.  Sometimes hardship hardens,172 
and sometimes those who are socially isolated are more likely to be receptive 
to out-groups.173 
It is interesting to note that “powerful” potential jurors may be the least 
likely to be empathetic.174  This does not, however, give clear guidance to 
choose the meek and lowly because the ability to “hold out” against a pro-
death majority is as also critical from the defense perspective.  It does, 
however, lend support to the conventional wisdom that the defense does not 
want a cohesive, socially integrated jury. 
But at this point, even a search for “empathetic jurors” looks too simplistic.  
Does a defense lawyer want an empathetic juror?  Prior to doing the research 
for this article, we (and we think most capital defense lawyers) would have 
answered that question quickly and affirmatively.  But that now appears to 
be an unsophisticated answer.  Jurors with higher levels of trait empathy may 
be more likely to empathize with the defendant—or they may be more likely 
to empathize with the victim or victim’s family and punish the defendant 
more harshly.  Caution seems in order, and the best recommendation may be 
to closely question jurors about their receptivity to certain forms of mitigation 
and the strength of their default position preferences for life and death.175 
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2016] WHEN EMPATHY BITES BACK 595 
B.  The Presentation of Evidence 
Empathy research can also inform how evidence in both aggravation and 
mitigation is presented. 
1.  Evidence in Aggravation 
Viewed formally, the penalty phase of capital trials in most jurisdictions 
consists of prosecution evidence offered in aggravation and defense evidence 
offered in mitigation.  States differ in whether jurors are instructed that 
aggravation and mitigation are to be “weighed” against each other, 
considered (independently) without weighing, or, as in Texas, whether future 
dangerousness must be assessed.  But regardless of the statutory scheme, in 
the penalty phase, the prosecution offers evidence designed to convince the 
jury that the defendant deserves death, or, speaking loosely, evidence “in 
aggravation” of the crime. 
But whether called evidence in aggravation, victim impact evidence, or 
evidence establishing guilt, much of the evidence presented by the state in a 
capital trial serves to place the defendant in an out-group, and large portions 
of it dehumanize him.  In some measure, this is inevitable, assuming the 
legitimacy of capital punishment, because some people deserve to die or are 
not worthy of belonging to the human community.  When dehumanization is 
based solely upon the defendant’s deeds, we would have to concede that it is 
consistent with capital punishment jurisprudence (though not, in our view, 
normatively justified). 
However, when dehumanization is pursued through tactics such as 
eliciting testimony that compares aspects of the defendant’s behavior or 
appearance to animals176 or repeated references to the race of the defendant 
or victim, the consequence is an increased likelihood of arbitrary decision 
making.  There is no value to this testimony, and its elicitation should be 
prohibited.  When judges have to make closer calls on the relevance or 
prejudice versus probative value of inflammatory facts—such as gang or hate 
group membership, religious affiliation, or undocumented presence in this 
country—they should be guided by the findings we have reported and assume 
that the prejudicial load of such facts is very high. 
Moreover, the findings reported here make plain that the focus on “victim 
impact” approved by Payne v. Tennessee177 was a wrong turn.  Although at 
one time the Supreme Court deemed evidence of the moral character of the 
victim and the consequences of the victim’s death on surviving family 
members irrelevant to the capital sentencing decision, and therefore 
inadmissible,178 it changed its mind.  Now, the prosecution may present a 
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“brief glance” into the life and character of the victim and the suffering to 
others caused by his or her murder.179  Despite the fact that the prosecution 
offers “victim impact” evidence as part of its penalty phase case, the Supreme 
Court has declined to categorize it as evidence in aggravation, and instead 
has justified its admission as balancing the picture presented to the jury, 
which may hear a great deal about the life and characteristics of the 
defendant.  But call it aggravation or call it a “brief glimpse,” focus on the 
victim raises the likelihood of empathy-induced aggression, for which there 
is no constitutional justification. 
2.  Evidence in Mitigation 
We are guessing that some defense counsel looking at this Article will skip 
to this section.  How is it that they can create empathy for their clients, 
whatever the juror’s initial preferences were?  Put differently, if the search 
for trait empathy is not productive, perhaps a focus on state empathy is more 
useful. 
The capital defense community has already embraced specificity and detail 
in the presentation of mitigation; testimony that the defendant was abused as 
a child is less helpful than testimony describing the nature of his injuries, the 
frequency of abuse, and specific episodes that a witness recalls.  The CJP 
interviews have shown that expert testimony—which tends to be general—is 
most persuasive when augmented by lay witnesses observations.180  The 
research on empathy explains why specificity matters:  it is more likely to 
evoke the automatic affective response.  One might hypothesize that expert 
testimony augmented by lay testimony activates both affective and cognitive 
forms of empathy. 
Empathy research also suggests that exclusive focus on the hardships the 
defendant suffered might be a mistake; providing the jury with evidence that, 
but for those hardships, the defendant “could have been a contender” may be 
equally important.  In other words, presenting some positive attributes and 
experiences of the defendant, or even a large number of mundane experiences 
or preferences, may be useful in promoting juror identification with the 
defendant.  This is important because, without such identification, empathy 
is much less likely. 
Defense counsel also should consider the possibility of trying to generate 
empathy for a third party (other than the victim, of course), which research 
suggests may spill over to the defendant.  The obvious possibility is the 
defendant’s family, depending on how sympathetic they are, but it might also 
be for another person, even defense counsel in some cases.  Another 
possibility is to use closing arguments—where lawyers have a great deal of 
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freedom to use rhetorical flourishes to illustrate their arguments—to retell 
familiar stories that evoke empathy.181 
C.  Arguments of Counsel 
By this point, it should be obvious that counsel’s use of racial imagery, or 
animal imagery, or any form of emphasis on the group membership of the 
defendant, victim, or witnesses, or comparison of the worth of the 
defendant’s life to that of the victim, should never be permitted.  The research 
on empathy, however, is not needed to reach this conclusion; courts have 
routinely condemned such inflammatory arguments for a long time.  
Nonetheless, courts virtually never reverse cases for such arguments, citing 
a host of reasons such as the “isolated” nature of the remarks, defense 
counsel’s failure to object to the remarks, defense counsel’s 
counterarguments, or harmlessness.182  At the very least, the neuroscience of 
empathy compels the conclusion that harmlessness of the error—at least with 
respect to the sentencing decision—should be taken off the list of acceptable 
reasons for affirmance. 
We cannot resist noting that we are fascinated by the findings regarding 
asking subjects to imagine whether a wrongdoer likes vegetables.  Asking 
jurors to imagine dietary preferences certainly would be unconventional 
argument, but perhaps these findings are simply confirmation of the broader 
principle that asking jurors to imagine the defendant’s walk in life in specific 
respects is likely to remind them that the defendant is an individual.  Perhaps 
asking jurors how they thought the defendant felt when he was beaten with a 
pipe at the age of nine, or saw his mother shot at the age of twelve is as 
important as eliciting the details of his abuse or trauma. 
CONCLUSION:  
TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY OF EMPATHY 
We began this article with Dietrich Bonhoffer’s admonition that “[w]e 
must learn to regard people less in light of what they do or omit to do and 
more in light of what they suffer.”183  While we find this to be an inspirational 
statement, it is clearly aspirational rather than descriptive.  Our introduction 
juxtaposed that aspiration with the response of a real juror to the question of 
why an African American defendant had committed murder:  “Because he 
was just a dumb nigger.”184  That juror’s response is a particularly ugly 
example of the broader truth that empathy, like justice, often is not blind. 
Justice Harry Blackmun, after many years of experience with capital cases, 
concluded that the death penalty experiment had failed, declaring, “I no 
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longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”185  The neuroscience of 
empathy provides one more reason to believe that the decision to sentence 
another human being to death is inevitably an arbitrary one, and one that 
cannot be divorced from either race or caprice.  While we can tinker with 
aspects of capital trials that exacerbate caprice and discrimination stemming 
from empathy, we cannot alter basic neural responses to the pain of others 
and therefore cannot rationalize (in either sense of the word) empathic 
responses. 
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